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  INTRODUCTION   
Civil death is a legal status with roots in ancient Greece 
and brought to the American colonies from England. It de-
prived individuals convicted of certain offenses, often those 
with capital or life sentences, of all of their legal rights. Alt-
hough civil death mostly disappeared in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury,
1
 one of its vestiges is the disenfranchisement of individu-
als convicted of a felony offense, enshrined in various forms in 
most state constitutions and statutes, including Minnesota’s.  
Minnesota has retained essentially the same disenfran-
chisement law adopted upon gaining statehood in 1857. How-
ever, since that time, Minnesota’s criminal justice system has 
undergone massive changes, especially in its expansion in 
scope—resulting in one of the highest rates of correctional con-
trol in the country, and therefore one of the highest rates of fel-
ony disenfranchisement in the country and by far in the region.  
This Article proposes that Minnesota’s essentially un-
changed 157-year-old policy warrants careful reconsideration. 
An analysis of the modern manifestation of the policy reveals 
 
 † Mark Haase is a private attorney specializing in government rela-
tions. He was formerly Vice President of the Council on Crime Justice, a crim-
inal justice service, research, and policy reform nonprofit organization that he 
now represents as coordinator and lobbyist for Restore the Vote–Minnesota, a 
coalition of over sixty organizations advocating to allow Minnesotans on felony 
probation and parole to vote. Copyright © 2015 by Mark Haase. 
 1. Civil death has also reemerged in the form of numerous limitations 
upon individuals with criminal records, known as collateral consequences. See 
Gabriel J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of 
Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA L. REV. 1789, 1790 (2012). Disenfranchisement is 
just one example of the many collateral consequences in Minnesota to which 
some or all of the analysis in this Article, as well as other arguments for and 
against, could be applied.  
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that its modern impact is greatly divergent from its original in-
tent and impact, the product of a greatly expanded criminal 
justice system. A cost-benefit analysis also reveals that there 
essentially are no tangible benefits to Minnesota’s current dis-
enfranchisement policy, that its costs are high, and that there 
are tangible benefits to reform. The policy provides no public 
safety benefit, may even reduce public safety, perpetuates ra-
cial disparities, confuses elections, and unnecessarily expends 
government resources.
2
 These negative policy impacts weighed 
against little to no benefit, combined with changes in criminal 
justice politics and recent national events, may provide a ripe 
time for reform. 
Part I of this Article describes Minnesota’s disenfran-
chisement law, including its history, current impact, and a 
comparison to other states and countries. Part II describes 
some of the relevant changes in Minnesota’s criminal justice 
system since becoming a state. Part III provides a cost-benefit 
analysis of Minnesota’s felony disenfranchisement policy.
3
 Fi-
nally, Part IV describes the status of current reform efforts. 
I.  FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN MINNESOTA   
Felony disenfranchisement is dictated by state law.
4
 The 
residents of the Minnesota Territory chose a fairly common and 
 
 2. This Article will focus on the issue mostly as it relates to public safety 
and other pragmatic public policy implications. For an analysis of the political 
theory arguments, see Jason Schall, The Consistency of Felon Disenfranchise-
ment with Citizenship Theory, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 53 (2006). Schall 
concludes that felony disenfranchisement is inconsistent with the individual 
and rights oriented view of liberal thought, but that the civic-bond oriented 
republic philosophy can supply arguments for and against the practice. Id. at 
53. 
 3. The issue of constitutionality will not be addressed; this Article will 
instead focus on policy analysis. Challenges to the constitutionality of felony 
disenfranchisement under the U.S. Constitution have been unsuccessful. See 
Liles Macro, Challenges to Felony Disenfranchisement Laws: Past, Present, 
and Future, 58 ALA. L. REV. 615 (2007). However, challenging Minnesota’s fel-
ony disenfranchisement law under the Minnesota Constitution may warrant 
consideration, especially under equal protection arguments. See State v. Rus-
sell, 477 N.W.2d 886, 891 (Minn. 1991) (ruling that the disparate impact of 
Minnesota’s crack cocaine sentencing laws upon African Americans was un-
constitutional under Minnesota’s Constitution based upon evidence of discrim-
inatory impact alone, without requiring proof of intentional discrimination as 
required by felony disenfranchisement cases brought under the U.S. Constitu-
tion); see also Jeffery A. Kruse, Substantive Equal Protection Analysis Under 
State v. Russell, and the Potential Impact on the Criminal Justice System, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1791 (1993). 
 4. Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment has been 
found to allow disenfranchisement by the states “for participation in rebellion, 
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uncontroversial policy for the state when creating its constitu-
tion, but today that policy makes Minnesota an outlier in sev-
eral ways. This Part will describe the current policy and its im-
pact and history in more detail. 
A. CURRENT POLICY  
Minnesota’s Constitution prohibits from voting any person 
“convicted of treason or felony, unless restored to civil rights.”
5
 
Minnesota Statutes § 609.165 is the mechanism that restores 
the “full right to vote and hold office,”
6
 upon discharge from 
sentence. In other words, once a resident of Minnesota has 
completed their entire sentence for a felony conviction,
7
 includ-
ing any term of probation or parole, their right to vote is auto-
matically restored. 
Minnesota’s policy is not an uncommon approach in the 
United States. Eighteen states currently share Minnesota’s pol-
icy of disenfranchisement until completion of felony probation 
or parole.
8
 Twenty states have less restrictive policies, either 
never disenfranchising, as is the case in Maine and Vermont, or 
allowing those on parole or probation to vote.
9
 Only eleven 
states have more restrictive policies in that they somehow limit 
voting even after community supervision is completed.
10
  
However, Minnesota, along with the rest of the United 
States, disenfranchises many more of its citizens than much of 
 
or other crime.” Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54–55 (1974).  
 5. MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 6. Section 609.165 is entitled “Restoration of Civil Rights; Possession of 
Firearms.” MINN. STAT. § 609.165 (2014). The right to possess firearms is de-
nied for life under Minnesota law for those convicted of a “crime of violence.” 
Id. § 624.713; see also id. § 624.712 (defining “crime of violence”). 
 7. A felony is any offense with a sentence of greater than one year. Id. 
§ 609.02. 
 8. The other states that share Minnesota’s policy are Alaska, Arkansas, 
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, 
West Virginia, and Wisconsin. COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUSTICE, FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT 1 (2014), available at http://www.crimeandjustice.org/ 
pdffiles/disenfranchisement%20FAQ%20Jan%202014.pdf. 
 9. Thirteen states disenfranchise only those who are incarcerated—
Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, New Hamp-
shire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Utah. Id. 
Five states disenfranchise those in prison or on parole but allow those on pro-
bation to vote—California, Colorado, Connecticut, New York, and South Dako-
ta. Id. 
 10. The following states require waiting periods after discharge from sen-
tence or completion of some type of restoration process—Alabama, Arizona, 
Delaware, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, Tennessee, Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming. Id.  
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the rest of the world. Prisoners can vote in countries such as 
the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Israel, Japan, Kenya, 
Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sweden, and 
Zimbabwe.
11
 Other countries disenfranchise only those who 
have committed crimes of treason or related to election fraud, 
or for short periods following a prison term.
12
 The European 
Court of Human Rights has ruled that automatic disenfran-
chisement based on conviction is a violation of the European 
Declaration of Human Rights.
13
 Important to the comparison of 
these policies, the United States’ incarceration rate is vastly 
higher, and Minnesota’s somewhat higher, than most of the 
rest of the world.
14
  
The impact of these policies in the United States and Min-
nesota is large. According to a 2012 report, 5.85 million citizens 
nationally can no longer vote due to a felony conviction.
15
 In 
2011, approximately 57,000 Minnesotans were unable to vote 
due to a felony conviction.
16
 This constitutes 1.5% of Minneso-
 
 11. JAMIE FELLNER ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (1998), available at http://www 
.sentencingproject.org/doc/file/fvr/fd_losingthevote.pdf. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, FACTSHEET – PRISONERS’ RIGHT 
TO VOTE (2014), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_ 
Prisoners_vote_ENG.pdf. The court ruled that the rights guaranteed under 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (con-
cerning the right to free elections) are “crucial to establishing and maintaining 
the foundations of an effective and meaningful democracy,” and that blanket 
criminal disenfranchisement policies, without regard for the particular crime 
or circumstances, violate this Article. Id. (quoting Hirst v. United Kingdom 
(No. 2), Grand Chamber judgment of Oct. 6, 2005, § 58). The Court also ruled 
that the rights bestowed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 are not absolute and 
that there is room for implied limitations. Id. 
 14. According to the International Centre for Prison Studies, the world 
average incarceration rate is 155 per 100,000 inhabitants. ROY WALMSLEY, 
INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (10th ed. 
2013), available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/sites/prisonstudies.org/files/ 
resources/downloads/wppl_10.pdf. The United States incarcerates 716 per 
100,000. Id. According to the Sentencing Project, Minnesota incarcerates 184 
per 100,000. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. 
CORRECTIONS 4 (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/ 
publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_Fact_sheet.pdf. 
 15. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE-
LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 
2010, at 1 (2012), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_ 
State_Level_Estimates_of_Felon_Disen_2010.pdf. 
 16. Christopher Uggen & Suzy McElrath, Draft Report on Felon Disen-
franchisement in Minnesota 1 (Oct. 14, 2012) (on file with the University of 
Minnesota Department of Sociology), available at http://www.soc.umn.edu/ 
~uggen/MNReport_2012.pdf. 
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ta’s voting age population.
17
 Because, as will be discussed later, 
Minnesota relies heavily on community supervision, approxi-
mately 82% of those disenfranchised in Minnesota were not be-
hind bars—nearly 5800 were on parole and over 41,000 were on 
probation.
18
 They come from all over the state. Thirty-three 
percent of the felonies committed in 2012 were in the counties 
of Ramsey and Hennepin, where 32% of the state population 
resides, and the remaining 67% were committed throughout 
the rest of the state.
19
  
Relative to other states, Minnesota’s disenfranchisement 
rate of 1.5% is higher than most, and two-to-three times higher 
than most states in the north central region of the United 
States. Twenty-eight states have lower rates than Minnesota.
20
 
Comparing Minnesota to all of the other states in the north 
central region of the country highlights the fact that Minneso-
ta’s rate is by far one of the highest in the area.
21
 Wisconsin’s 
rate is roughly the same,
22
 but rates in all other states in the 
region are lower, some much lower. For example, North Dako-
ta’s disenfranchisement rate is 0.3%, Iowa’s and Kansas’s are 
both 0.9%, and Indiana’s and Michigan’s are 0.6%.
23
 
B. POLICY ORIGINS AND ADOPTION 
Minnesota’s Constitution was created in a time when the 
elective franchise was much more limited than it is today. That 
changed drastically during the first century of statehood. How-
ever, the felony disenfranchisement provision, based on ancient 
concepts, has stayed essentially the same  since then. 
When citizens of the Minnesota Territory were enabled by 
the United States Congress to become a state in 1857, the poli-
tics of the time were so contentious that the constitutional con-
vention split into two factions. Two constitutions were written, 
one by the Republican Party and one by the Democratic Party.
24
 
The most contentious point of disagreement was whether to al-
 
 17. Id. at 3. 
 18. Id. 
 19. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, REPORT TO THE 
LEGISLATURE 2 (2013), available at http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/ 
images/2013%2520Leg%2520Report%2520Repost.pdf.  
 20. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 16. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. Other states in the region include Montana (0.5%), South Dakota 
(1.1%), Illinois (0.5%), and Nebraska (1.3%). Id.  
 24. See WILLIAM ANDERSON & ALBERT J. LOBB, A HISTORY OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF MINNESOTA 69–86 (Univ. of Minn. 1921). 
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low African American males to vote—Republicans supported 
African American suffrage but Democrats did not.
25
 The Demo-
crats prevailed on that point,
26
 so when one version was adopt-
ed, Minnesota’s Constitution limited the right to vote to white 
males over age twenty-one and “Persons of Indian blood, who 
have adopted its customs and habits of civilization.”
27
 The pro-
vision prohibiting those convicted of treason or felony from vot-
ing, however, was apparently not debated.
28
 Minnesota’s Con-
stitution, adopted on August 29, 1857, barred from voting, like 
it still does today, those “convicted of treason, or any felony, un-
less restored to civil rights.”
29
 
The absence of debate is not surprising given the fact that 
the concept of disenfranchising citizens based on conduct al-
ready had its roots deeply embedded in western law, first in 
ancient Greece and Rome, then in medieval Europe.
30
 In an-
cient Greece the status of “infamy” denied citizens convicted of 
crimes the right to vote, appear in court, serve in the army, 
make speeches, or attend assemblies.
31
 The Romans adopted 
this tradition, and prohibited the “infamous” from holding office 
or voting.
32
 Roman influence spread through Europe, and in 
England those who had violated society’s norms lost its rights 
and protections,
33
 typically resulting in a death sentence.
34
 The 
tradition of infamy developed into the practice of “attainder” 
and “corruption of blood.”
35
 Attainted criminals lost the ability 
to transfer land to heirs,
36
 and could not sue, testify in court, or 
 
 25. Id. at 72. 
 26. Id. at 99. The Republicans did, however, prevail in making the consti-
tution easier to amend, with the hope that the franchise could be expanded to 
African Americans at a later date. Id. 
 27. Id. at 231.  
 28. A review of two texts detailing the creation of Minnesota’s Constitu-
tion did not discover any mention of debate regarding felony disenfranchise-
ment. See generally ANDERSON & LOBB, supra note 24; MARY JANE MORRISON, 
THE MINNESOTA STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE (2002).  
 29. MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 30. See George Brooks, Felon Disenfranchisement: Law, History, Policy, 
and Politics, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 851, 852–53 (2004). 
 31. Walter Matthews Grant et al., Special Project, The Collateral Conse-
quences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 941 (1970). 
 32. Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal 
Disenfranchisement Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1059 
(2002); Grant, supra note 31, at 942. 
 33. Grant, supra note 31, at 942. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 942–43.  
 36. Id. at 943. 
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serve as jurors; they suffered “civil death.”
37
 According to Wil-
liam Blackstone, attainder was used “when it is . . . clear be-
yond all dispute, that the criminal is no longer to live upon the 
earth, but is to be exterminated as a monster and a bane to 
human society.”
38
 American colonists brought some of these 
traditions with them, and limited the franchise based upon 
conduct in various ways.
39
 After the Revolution, bills of attain-
der, forfeiture for treason, and corruption of blood were consti-
tutionally prohibited.
40
 But many states continued to disenfran-
chise based upon felony conviction. As of 1868, twenty-nine of 
thirty-seven states prohibited citizens convicted of felonies from 
voting.
41
 
Minnesota was one of the states that adopted felony disen-
franchisement before the Civil War. After the Civil War, former 
slave states were required to allow Blacks to vote, and so more 
states passed disenfranchisement laws with the intent of disen-
franchising Blacks in particular.
42
 Three years after the Civil 
War, ten years after its adoption, Minnesota’s Constitution was 
amended to allow Black males to vote.
43
 In later years, the 
franchise was expanded to women, all Native Americans, and 
eighteen- to twenty-year-olds.
44
 The process for having civil 
rights restored after felony conviction went through some 
changes through the years, during one period requiring appli-
cation to the governor or district court.
45
 However, Minnesota’s 
 
 37. See Chin, supra note 1, at 1793–94. 
 38. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 373. 
 39. Schall, supra note 2, at 55–60. 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to de-
clare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Cor-
ruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attaint-
ed.”). 
 41. Brooks, supra note 30, at 853. 
 42. See generally Angela Behrens et al., Ballot Manipulation and the 
“Menace of Negro Domination”: Racial Threat and Felon Disenfranchisement 
in the United States, 1850–2002, 109 AM. J. SOC. 559 (2003). 
 43. ANDERSON & LOBB, supra note 24 at 178–79. 
 44. Id. at 179–80. 
 45. It is not clear what the process was before 1907. A review of the stat-
utes found no provision explicitly restoring civil rights, though it is possible 
that a pardon would have been a mechanism for this. In 1907 a statute was 
enacted providing that those convicted of a felony and fined or sent to county 
jail could have their rights restored one year after judgment by applying to the 
district court with three witnesses to testify to his or her “good character.” Act 
of Mar. 7, 1907, ch. 34, § 1, 1907 Gen. Laws Minn. 40, 40. In 1919 those who 
had been sentenced to a state reformatory or prison “may be restored by the 
governor, in his discretion, to civil rights, upon certification to him by the 
judge, officer or board having jurisdiction, custody or supervision of such per-
son at the time such jurisdiction, custody or supervision is terminated . . . .” 
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constitutional provision disenfranchising those convicted of a 
felony remained unchanged.
46
  
II.  A CHANGED LANDSCAPE   
While the underlying law regarding felony disenfran-
chisement has remained essentially unchanged, the surround-
ing landscape, particularly in the criminal justice arena, has 
gone through massive changes in the last 157 years.  
One major change has been the reach and impact of the 
criminal law into Minnesotans’ lives and conduct. A great in-
crease in criminally defined conduct has been seen throughout 
the country, Minnesota not excepted.
47
 In the 1860s, there were 
approximately seventy-five felony level crimes in Minnesota 
statutes.
48
 Today there are over 375.
49
  
Minnesota’s overall criminal justice system policies have 
changed significantly as well. At the time of the adoption of 
Minnesota’s Constitution, there was no such thing as stayed 
sentences or probation. Conviction of a felony only had one out-
come—time in the state prison. But as Minnesota has added 
felony crimes to the statutes, and joined and often led national 
criminal justice reform trends, it has also come to rely heavily 
on community supervision rather than incarceration.
50
 In 1909, 
Minnesota became one of the first states to adopt a stayed sen-
tence statute, meaning that a judge could sentence someone 
convicted of a felony to probation or fines rather than only pris-
on.
51
 In 1973, Minnesota became the first state to create a 
community corrections act, designed to develop and deliver 
 
Act of Apr. 17, 1919, ch. 290, § 1, 1919 Minn. Laws 299, 299. The current “au-
tomatic” restoration provision was not created until 1963. See Criminal Code 
of 1963, ch. 753, § 609.165, 1963 Minn. Laws 1185, 1198.  
 46. The word “any” was removed as part of a 1974 constitutional amend-
ment to revise the organization and language of the Constitution. Act of Apr. 
10, 1974, ch. 409, § 1, 1974 Minn. Laws 787, 800. This change, however, did 
not alter the substance of the provision.  
 47. See GO DIRECTLY TO JAIL: THE CRIMINALIZATION OF ALMOST 
EVERYTHING (Gene Healy ed., 2004).  
 48. See MINN. STAT. chs. 93–101 (1866). 
 49. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY 96–123 (Aug. 
1, 2014), available at http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/images/2014% 
2520Guidelines.pdf. 
 50. RESEARCH DEP’T, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MANDATORY 
SENTENCING LAWS 2 (2011), available at http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/ 
images/2012ControlledSubstanceReport.pdf (describing the modern stayed 
sentencing regime in Minnesota). 
 51. See Act of Apr. 22, 1909, ch. 93, 1910 Revised Laws Minn. 919 (codify-
ing stayed sentences).  
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sanctions for criminal offenders in lieu of incarceration.
52
 Then, 
in 1980, Minnesota became the first state to adopt legally-
binding sentencing guidelines.
53
 The state used guidelines and 
a permanent guidelines commission to develop a sentencing 
policy that stays within the limits of available prison capacity.
54 
This was a major contributing factor in Minnesota’s prison 
populations growing much more slowly in the 1980s than the 
national prison population.
55
 However, the emphasis on regu-
lating prison sentences and limiting the high costs of prison 
may have contributed to increased use of jail terms combined 
with probation.
56
 The goal throughout has been cost savings 
and emphasizing rehabilitation, but this process has not led to 
a relatively lower conviction rate. Minnesota has one of the 
lowest incarceration rates in the United States,
57
 but it has the 
seventh highest rate of correctional control and the fourth 
highest rate of probation.
58
 The relatively greater use of com-
munity supervision, notwithstanding conviction for a felony of-
fense, has therefore been a significant factor in Minnesota hav-
ing a relatively high disenfranchisement rate.
59
 
Another major contributor to the increase in number and 
length of felony sentences has been the war on drugs as waged 
in Minnesota.
60
 As noted above, Minnesota’s sentencing guide-
lines, adopted in 1980, limited the use of prisons in Minnesota 
compared to other states.
61
 Ultimately, however, case law and 
legislative changes led to Minnesota’s developing some of the 
 
 52. MARY K. SHILTON, COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS ACTS FOR STATE AND 
LOCAL PARTNERSHIPS 5 (1992), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/ 
static.nicic.gov/Library/010132.pdf. 
 53. G. LARRY MAYS & L. THOMAS WINFREE, JR., ESSENTIALS OF 
CORRECTIONS 360 (2009). 
 54. Richard Frase, Sentencing Policy and Criminal Justice in Minnesota: 
Past, Present, and Future, COUNCIL ON CRIME & JUST., http://www 
.crimeandjustice.org/councilinfo.cfm?pID=52 (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 
2008, at 34 tbl.A-6 (2008), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/ 
legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2008/one20in20100pdf.pdf.  
 58. See PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF 
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 42 tbl.A-3, 44 tbl.A-5 (2009), available at http:// 
www.convictcriminology.org/pdf/pew/onein31.pdf. 
 59. Relatively high rates of conviction have implications for the impact of 
other collateral consequences of conviction as well. 
 60. Scott G. Swanson, Minnesota’s Controlled Substances Law: A History, 
BENCH & B. MINN. (Dec. 1999), http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/1999/ 
dec99/drugs.htm. 
 61. See Frase, supra note 54. 
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harshest drug sentencing laws in the country.
62
 “Courts [were] 
faced with the situation where a person selling $1200 worth of 
cocaine receives (per the guidelines) the same sentence as a 
person who approaches a stranger at gunpoint and commits a 
rape.”
63
 An individual convicted of possession with intent to sell 
thirteen grams of powder cocaine in 1981 would have received a 
twelve month stayed sentence, but by 1998, that same individ-
ual could have a presumptive sentence of 158 months in pris-
on.
64
 In 1991, the average prison sentence for drug offenses was 
thirty-five months, but in 2003 it reached a peak of fifty-two 
months and was at forty-four months in 2012.
65
 The increase in 
disenfranchisement during the same time period shows the im-
pact of these policies. In 1974, the percentage of Minnesota’s 
voting age population disenfranchised was 0.35% percent.
66
 It 
more than quadrupled by 2011, when it had increased to 1.5%.
67
  
Due primarily to the criminal justice system changes de-
scribed above, the numbers and percentage of the population 
affected by Minnesota’s disenfranchisement law have changed 
dramatically since statehood. In the 1860 census, thirty-two 
prisoners were recorded (sixteen “native” and sixteen “for-
eign”).
68
 As noted previously, there was no such thing as proba-
tion or parole in Minnesota until 1909, so there were no addi-
tional people convicted of felonies serving their sentence in the 
community.
69
 This means only about 0.04% of Minnesota’s vot-
ing age population was disenfranchised.
70
 With today’s disen-
franchisement rate of 1.5%, that is a 3,650% rate increase.  
Minnesota adopted its felony disenfranchisement policy 
 
 62. See MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, UPDATED REPORT ON 
DRUG OFFENDER SENTENCING ISSUES 1–3 (2007), available at http://mn.gov/ 
sentencing-guidelines/images/2012ControlledSubstanceReport.pdf. 
 63. Swanson, supra note 60. 
 64. Id. 
 65. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, SENTENCING PRACTICES, 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE OFFENSES SENTENCED IN 2012, at 13 (2013), availa-
ble at http://mn.gov/sentencing-guidelines/images/2012ControlledSubstance 
Report.pdf. 
 66. Uggen & McElrath, supra note 16, at 3. 
 67. Id. 
 68. 1 FRANCIS A. WALKER, DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, NINTH CENSUS, 569 
tbl.XIX (1870). 
 69. The Minnesota legislature enacted a general law authorizing proba-
tion in 1909. HOMER CUMMINGS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE PROCEDURES 573 (1939). 
 70. The state population was 172,023. WALKER, supra note 68, at 569. Of 
that population, 57,089 were under the age of ten. Id. at 741. If we roughly es-
timate that another 30,000 were age ten to twenty-one, this gives a voting age 
population of 84,934. 
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based on ancient law in a time when felony conviction was re-
served for a much smaller range of conduct than today, and on-
ly applied to the small number of Minnesotans in prison at the 
time. Today its scope is so much greater that in effect it has be-
come a policy altogether different from what it was originally, 
which warrants taking a close look at whether its goals and any 
benefits of its current manifestation outweigh the costs.  
III.  REVISITING FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT   
We cannot know if the founders of Minnesota would sup-
port the modern impact of the policy they gave the State with 
seemingly little controversy, but the change in impact certainly 
raises the question. Regardless of the answer, the question 
warrants a close reexamination of the policy and careful con-
sideration of its goals and costs and benefits, rather than simp-
ly allowing the policy to be maintained with little scrutiny, as it 
has for so long. 
There are several main arguments for maintaining current 
felony disenfranchisement law, two of which seem to predomi-
nate.
71
 One is that felony disenfranchisement maintains the 
“purity of the ballot box” by preventing harmful changes to the 
law, and the other is that disenfranchisement is simply de-
served punishment for violation of the social contract.
72
  
First, some argue that allowing felons to vote runs the risk 
of election outcomes that would be harmful, particularly if they 
might elect “lenient judges and prosecutors.”
73
 It is not clear if 
this was part of the goal of the original policy adoption, alt-
hough, as noted above, even if it was, it would have only im-
pacted the small number serving prison sentences.
74
 Many oth-
er states at the time more narrowly tailored their policies to 
meet this goal, only disenfranchising based upon specified 
crimes thought to have some relationship to the electoral pro-
cess, such as perjury, bribery, or betting on elections.
75
 Today, 
this fear of influence is based on speculation—there has been 
no evidence put forward to support it. Regardless, the idea of 
 
 71. Brooks, supra note 30, at 896. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Jim Ragsdale, Hot Dish Politics: Felons’ Rights All Over the Map, 
STAR TRIBUNE, http://www.startribune.com/politics/statelocal/255038151.html 
(last updated Apr. 12, 2014, 5:05 PM) (“Defenders of the current system, in-
cluding Minnesota Majority . . . say[] felons are ‘outlaws’ who should not have 
a hand in creating laws ‘that the law-abiding live under.’ Such voters would, 
they contend, have an interest in electing lenient judges and prosecutors.”). 
 74.  See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
 75. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 162 (2000). 
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denying citizens the fundamental act of voting in our democra-
cy because of how they might vote is dangerous territory, espe-
cially for those whom the policy decision has already been made 
to allow them to live in the community where they are subject 
to the laws under which they are living, including the payment 
of taxes. Additionally, there are many types of behaviors that 
may make us question the wisdom of someone’s electoral choic-
es but we do not disenfranchise or propose to disenfranchise 
them. One could argue that behavior deemed criminal is differ-
ent, but even if one agrees that criminal behavior should be the 
determining factor, again we must consider if the current scope 
of the policy is appropriate and worth reaching this goal, as 
discussed later. However, regardless of one’s belief in the mer-
its of this argument, excluding voters because of how they 
might vote has been found unconstitutional.
76
 
Second, some argue that felony disenfranchisement is 
simply part of the cost of committing a crime—
disenfranchisement is an appropriate cost because felony of-
fenders have broken the social contract and voting is one of a 
number of privileges that can be taken away as a conse-
quence.
77
 Based upon the ancient origins of the policy this was 
certainly one of the original goals of Minnesota’s policy, but 
again would have only applied to the small number serving 
prison sentences.
78
 Counter arguments include questioning 
whether a state may punish offenders by depriving them of any 
right it chooses without consideration for the reasons; and sug-
gesting that such punishment must conform to the fundamen-
tal principles of criminal sanctions, including being imposed by 
a judge following trial, and being proportionate to the offense.
79
 
It is also important to note that, as a form of punishment, felo-
ny disenfranchisement only satisfies one of the goals of pun-
ishment—retribution. There is no evidence that it assists in the 
realization of three of the other goals—deterrence, rehabilita-
tion, or restoration. And the fifth goal, incapacitation, would 
only apply to a very small number of individuals convicted of 
electoral crimes. Some supplement the punishment argument 
by stating that Minnesota’s current policies do not punish peo-
ple enough, and if we do not punish them by taking their voting 
 
 76. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) (“‘Fencing out’ a sector of 
the population from the franchise because of the way they may vote is consti-
tutionally impermissible.”). 
 77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.  
 78. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.  
 79. FELLNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 16. 
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rights away, they will not be punished at all.
80
 This supple-
mental argument minimizes the impact of other sanctions, in-
cluding terms of probation and the many collateral sanctions 
and consequences placed upon those convicted of felonies. In 
the context of these other consequences, such as difficulty in 
finding a job or housing, loss of voting would most likely be one 
of the lesser punishments in the mind of the offender, and not a 
significant source of any overall deterrent effect. However, if 
one truly believes that more punishment for punishment’s sake 
alone is needed, regardless of the consequences or lack of tan-
gible benefits, denying people the ability to take part in choos-
ing their government certainly will help achieve that goal.
81
  
Even if one agrees with either or both of these arguments 
in principle, two questions still need to be asked: (1) is the 
modern scope of Minnesota’s felony disenfranchisement policy 
appropriate; and (2) is the policy justified given its effects?  
First, as already discussed, the scope of this policy in Min-
nesota reaches a far greater percentage of our population than 
it did when implemented.
82
 Changes to the criminal justice 
landscape, as noted, have created a practical policy impact that 
is drastically different than it was in 1857. A vastly larger pro-
portion of Minnesota’s citizens are disenfranchised for a far 
wider scope of behavior. The great majority are living in the 
community rather than being incarcerated because other state 
policies have been created, despite conviction of a felony under 
current law, to allow these individuals to live in the community 
because it is better for rehabilitative purposes. These individu-
als live in the community and are subject to the laws that apply 
to everyone else, including taxes and fundamentally important 
things like school policies that impact how their children will 
 
 80. Dan McGrath, Executive Director of Minnesota Majority, told KARE 
11 news that “a lot of people that are convicted of felony crimes never serve a 
day in jail . . . . So deprivation of their rights is how we punish them. So if you 
take away this deprivation of rights, what is the punishment then? Are felons 
just to go scot free with no punishment whatsoever?” John Croman, Voting 
Rights for Released Felons Debated in Minn., KARE 11 (Jan. 31 2012), http:// 
www.kare11.com/news/article/959567/391/Voting-rights-for-released-felons-
debated-in-Minn (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81. Continuing to disenfranchise those in prison (2,200,300 persons na-
tionally) as opposed to including those serving a community supervision sen-
tence (6,899,000 persons) will still allow those who have already been deemed 
to have violated the social contract to such a degree as to warrant a prison 
term to continue to be punished through felony disenfranchisement. See 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2013, at 2 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf. 
 82. See supra Part II.  
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be educated. Minnesota’s relatively greater use of correctional 
control overall, as already noted, also has created a scope for 
this policy that is greater than most of the country and much 
greater than most states in the region.
83
 Again, some may argue 
that its current scope is appropriate for retributive purposes, 
but the numbers make it difficult to argue it is consistent with 
original intent. For retributive purposes, disenfranchising only 
those in prison rather than including those on community su-
pervision would seem to be more consistent with the original 
intent for the scope of the policy. Finally, when it comes to the 
important consideration of when it is appropriate for a funda-
mental liberty like voting to be denied, thereby prioritizing the 
rights of the state over the rights of the individual, the in-
creased extent to which our government is able to curtail this 
liberty through the criminal law is concerning. 
Second, as is the case when considering any public policy, 
we need to consider whether the benefits of the policy outweigh 
the costs. Other than addressing speculative fears of harmful 
influences in elections and being a means of retribution as not-
ed above, no other potential benefits have been identified. On 
the costs side of the equation, there are a number of pragmatic 
issues that need to be considered, including the impact upon 
public safety, the fairness of application to different groups, the 
impact upon elections administration, and the financial cost. 
Minnesota’s current policy may actually be harming public 
safety, and there is no evidence that it is helpful. Allowing peo-
ple to vote while on community supervision may help to reduce 
recidivism—research links pro-social activities like voting to 
desistence in crime; individuals interviewed about losing the 
right to vote express a feeling of being an “outsider” because 
they cannot vote; and empirical studies show some correlation 
between voting and lower recidivism.
84
 A 2011 report by the 
Florida Parole Commission found that ex-prisoners who had 
their voting rights restored had recidivism rates of eleven per-
cent compared to thirty-three percent for those who did not 
have their rights restored.
85
 The public safety benefit of pro-
social activity is a primary reason allowing those on community 
supervision to vote is supported by the American Probation and 
 
 83. See supra Part I.A. 
 84. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and 
Arrest: Evidence from a Community Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV, 
193, 212–15 (2004).  
 85. FLA. PAROLE COMM’N, STATUS UPDATE: RESTORATION OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS (RCR) CASES GRANTED 2009 AND 2010, at 7, 10 (2011), available at 
https://www.fcor.state.fl.us/docs/reports/2009-2010ClemencyReport.pdf. 
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Parole Association.
86
 The evidence shows that disenfranchise-
ment does not deter crime or lower recidivism. Public safety is 
thus not advanced and may actually be undermined by felony 
disenfranchisement.  
Minnesota’s policy also perpetuates racial disparities. At 
the time Minnesota adopted its constitution, felony disenfran-
chisement was a racially neutral policy. It was not until after 
the Civil War when former slave states were required to allow 
Blacks to vote that they began passing disenfranchisement 
laws with the intent of disenfranchising Blacks in particular.
87
 
However, due to racial disparities in the criminal justice sys-
tem in general, and in Minnesota in particular, felony disen-
franchisement is yet another area of great racial disparities. 
Disenfranchisement of African Americans is 7.7% of the African 
American, voting age population in Minnesota compared to 
1.1% of white, voting age Minnesotans.
88
 Minnesota’s African 
American disenfranchisement rate is the fifteenth highest in 
the country, putting Minnesota in the highest 30% of African 
American disenfranchisement rates, higher than former slave 
states such as Louisiana, Missouri, and Texas.
89
 Allowing those 
on community supervision to vote would reduce this rate to just 
over 2%.
90
 Similarly, disenfranchisement of Native Americans 
is 5.9% of the Native American voting age population in Minne-
sota, but could also be reduced to just over 2%.
91
 There are 
many proximate reasons for these disparities, but the root 
source is the disadvantages created by the treatment of these 
groups throughout the history of the United States.
92
 If recidi-
vism is in fact increased through disenfranchisement, then it 
will clearly continue the disparities in crime and the resulting 
disparities in employment and housing and potentially other 
areas impacted by the collateral consequences. It also contrib-
utes to the overall marginalization of these communities. This 
touches on the public safety argument for reform as well. Large 
 
 86. Restoration of Voting Rights Resolution, AM. PROBATION & PAROLE 
ASS’N (Sep. 2007), http://www.appa-net.org/eweb/Dynamicpage.aspx?site= 
APPA_2&webcode=IB_Resolution&wps_key=3c8f5612-9e1c-4f60-8e8b-
1bf46c00138e (“WHEREAS, disenfranchisement laws work against the suc-
cessful reentry of offenders.”).  
 87. Behrens et al., supra note 42, at 560–61. 
 88. Uggen & McElrath, supra note 16, at 4–5. 
 89. UGGEN ET AL., supra note 15, at 17. 
 90. Uggen & McElrath, supra note 16, at 9.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Robert J. Sampson & Janet L. Lauritsen, Racial and Ethnic Dispari-
ties in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States, 21 CRIME & JUST. 
311, 339–40 (1997). 
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disparate impact on some communities leads to community ex-
clusion that can undermine perceptions of system legitimacy, 
which in turn could have an adverse impact on public safety.
93
 
Reducing the rate of disenfranchisement for people of color 
would be one way to address racial disparities in the overall 
criminal justice system, allow for increased civic involvement 
for these communities, and provide some redress for the histor-
ical treatment that led to disparate levels of disenfranchise-
ment in the first place.  
Additionally, research suggests that children are more like-
ly to vote as adults if they are raised by parents who engage in 
the voting process.
94
 This means the negative effects of felony 
disenfranchisement on public safety and racial disparities de-
scribed above will have a deeper and longer effect if main-
tained.  
Felony disenfranchisement also confuses elections and has 
a significant financial cost. According to a survey of Minnesota 
county attorneys, in the 2008 elections, 1179 voters were inves-
tigated for voting while serving a felony sentence, resulting in 
thirty-eight new felony convictions for voting or registering to 
vote while ineligible.
95
 Many people are confused and disen-
franchised due to confusion and misinformation about the 
law.
96
 This is due to the various state laws and to misinfor-
mation that sometimes is even provided by government offi-
cials. For example, in the 2012 election, a probation officer told 
a young woman that her marijuana possession charge, even 
though the judge had stayed the felony conviction for five years 
pending successful completion of probation, prevented her from 
voting.
97
 It was not until the case was taken to the Minnesota 
 
 93. See Michael Rocque, Racial Disparities in the Criminal Justice System 
and Perceptions of Legitimacy: A Theoretical Linkage, 1 RACE & JUST. 292, 306 
(2011).  
 94. See Marilyn Gittell, Participation, Social Capital, and Social Change, 
in SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP 3, 6–7 (Sophie Body-Gendrot et 
al. eds., 2003). 
 95. KATHY BONNIFIELD & CAROL JOHNSON, FACTS ABOUT INELIGIBLE 
VOTING AND VOTER FRAUD IN MINNESOTA 12, 16 (2010), available at http:// 
ceimn.org/files/Facts%20about%20Ineligible%20Voting%20and%20Voter%20F
raud%20in%20Minnesota_with%20appendix.pdf.  
 96. See Editorial, Wrongly Turning Away Ex-Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
3, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/04/opinion/sunday/voting-rights 
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 97. Order at 2–4, Council on Crime and Justice v. Ritchie, No. A12-1871, 
(Minn. Oct. 31, 2012), available at http://www.crimeandjustice.org/misc/ 
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Supreme Court that clarification was provided that she and the 
thousands of other Minnesotans in her situation (individuals 
who had received a felony stay of adjudication) in fact can legal-
ly vote.
98
 The Minnesota Task Force on Election Integrity, es-
tablished by executive order by Governor Mark Dayton in 2011, 
found that “current Minnesota law has resulted in significant 
confusion to the courts, law enforcement and probation offi-
cials, and to individuals convicted of a felony.”
99
 The cost of this 
confusion and prosecution is difficult to measure. However, 
time spent by law enforcement personnel, county attorneys and 
staff, judges and court staff, and elections officials responding 
to it is clearly significant. 
In summary, the only clear and supportable goal of felony 
disenfranchisement appears to be retribution. While this is a 
principled position, it has nothing to offer in the way of benefits 
from a public policy perspective other than retribution for ret-
ribution’s sake. Balanced against the many costs of Minnesota’s 
disenfranchisement policy, it is clear that the costs far out-
weigh any benefits. 
IV.  MOVING FORWARD   
Given the above case for reforming Minnesota’s felony dis-
enfranchisement law, what support and opportunity is there for 
doing so? Reforms in other states have gone back and forth in 
recent decades, with more of a trend toward easing felony vot-
ing restrictions.
100
 Two states, Connecticut and Rhode Island, 
are the only states to have expanded the franchise to those 
serving probation or parole sentences in recent history.
101
 
Efforts have been made to expand voting rights in Minne-
sota in the past but only some progress has been made. In the 
2013–2014 biennium, with a DFL majority in the Minnesota 
legislature and Governor’s Office, a bill was introduced and 
passed two committees, but it was not heard by the additional 
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 101. Id. at 2.  
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committees it needed to pass.
102
 However, there is growing and 
more organized support for reform. A group of over sixty organ-
izations have formed a coalition called Restore the Vote–
Minnesota.
103
 The coalition advocates for “changes to the law 
that would allow people who have served their time and are liv-
ing in their community to vote.”
104
 From the faith perspective, 
supporters include representation from all major perspec-
tives—they include the Minnesota Catholic Conference, several 
Protestant groups, Jewish Community Action, and Muslims 
represented in the Joint Religious Legislative Coalition. The 
shared position of these groups on this issue can probably best 
be articulated by the Catholic concept of “solidarity,” which, in 
part, calls on Catholics to “insist on responsibility and seek al-
ternatives that do not simply punish, but rehabilitate, heal, 
and restore.”
105
 From the public safety and legal perspective, 
supporters include not only criminal defense and reentry fo-
cused groups, but corrections professionals represented by the 
Minnesota Community Corrections Association and the Minne-
sota Corrections Association.
106
 Minnesota’s prosecutor organi-
zation, the Minnesota County Attorneys Association, is also a 
member.
107
 From a political perspective, Liberty Minnesota and 
the Republican Liberty Caucus Minnesota are also coalition 
members.
108
 The coalition also includes a wide array of direct 
service and advocacy, civic engagement, good government, and 
civil rights focused groups like the NAACP.
109
 The only orga-
nized resistance to reform seems to have been a group called 
Minnesota Majority, which in the past had spoken out against 
reform in the press and raised allegations of people with felony 
convictions voting illegally while still serving their sentence.
110
 
The current extent and source of their support in the communi-
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ty and politically is unknown.
111
 Despite this large and diverse 
coalition supporting reform, success of the efforts will only be 
known once another effort at legislation has been made with a 
new legislature, which is now comprised of a Republican major-
ity in the House and a Democrat majority in the Senate.
112
  
It also remains to be seen whether changes and events na-
tionally will have an impact on these reform efforts in Minneso-
ta. Once the leaders of the tough on crime movement, conserva-
tives are reconsidering the results of that movement through a 
conservative lens.
113
 This shift is epitomized and to a large de-
gree led by a group called Right on Crime, led by Newt Gin-
grich and other high profile national conservatives.
114
 They are 
criticizing America’s criminal justice system as wasteful of both 
taxpayer dollars and human potential, and leading reforms 
around the country primarily to reduce incarceration.
115
 Alt-
hough this group has not weighed in specifically on voting dis-
enfranchisement, the new approach has opened the door for a 
strongly bipartisan critique of the current system and its con-
sequences in the entirety, including felony disenfranchisement. 
Another national conservative leader, Rand Paul, has advocat-
ed for creating less restrictive felony disenfranchisement policy 
in his home state of Kentucky.
116
  
The recent responses to grand jury acquittals of police of-
ficers who killed unarmed African American men in New York 
and Ferguson, Missouri, could potentially have an impact on 
these efforts as well. Impetus to reform all aspects of the crimi-
nal justice system, especially as it affects people of color, could 
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come from all political perspectives.
117
 Rand Paul also recently 
spoke out on this issue, saying, “given the racial disparities in 
our criminal justice system, it is impossible for African-
Americans not to feel like their government is particularly tar-
geting them.”
118
  
Finally, a 2002 national opinion poll showed that sixty per-
cent of Americans surveyed supported restoring voting rights to 
parolees and probationers.
119
 Polling data  that would show any 
changes in public opinion since that time are not available. 
  CONCLUSION   
Outside of a call for retribution with no tangible benefit, 
there are no strong arguments for maintaining Minnesota’s 
disenfranchisement policy. The vast divergence from the im-
pact of the original policy combined with its modern expansive 
scope and resultant costs make a strong argument for reform. 
The support from a broad and large coalition of groups from 
faith-based, public-safety, racial-justice, and other perspectives; 
combined with recent changes in national criminal justice re-
form politics and events, may allow for the strong public policy 
arguments for reform to win the day. But long-standing policies 
can be difficult to reform, regardless of the arguments against 
them, so only time will tell if Minnesota will maintain this ves-
tige of the ancient practice of civil death.  
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